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**The aff reduces class analysis to a "one of many" in difference politics - this rhetorical strategy ignores the structural productions of the very forces they criticize.**

**-Plurality**

**-Social Production of Difference**

**-Relations of Production b4 Discourse**

**McLaren & D'Anniable 4 -** (Peter, Valerie Scatamburlo, Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2004, © 2004 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia April 2004, Class Dismissed? Historical materialism and the politics of ‘difference)

Eager to take a wide detour around political economy, **post-Marxists** tend to **assume that the principal political points** of departure in the current ‘postmodern’ world **must** necessarily **be ‘cultural.**’ As such, most, but not all **post-Marxists have gravitated towards a politics of ‘difference’ which is** largely **premised on uncovering relations of power that reside in** the arrangement and deployment of subjectivity in **cultural and ideological practices** (cf. Jordan & Weedon, 1995). **Advocates of 'difference’ politics** therefore **posit their ideas as bold steps forward in advancing the interests of those historically marginalized** by ‘dominant’ social and cultural narratives. There is no doubt that post-Marxism has advanced our knowledge of the hidden trajectories of power within the processes of representation and that it remains useful in adumbrating the formation of subjectivity and its expressive dimensions as well as complementing our understandings of the relationships between ‘difference,’ language, and cultural conﬁgurations. However, **post-Marxists have been woefully remiss in addressing the constitution of class formations** and the machinations of capitalist social organization. In some instances**, capitalism and class relations have been thoroughly ‘otherized;**’ in others, class is summoned **only as part of the triumvirate of ‘race, class, and gender’ in which class is reduced to merely another form of ‘difference**.’ Enamored with the ‘cultural’ and seemingly ~~blind~~ to the ‘economic,’ **the rhetorical excesses** of post-Marxists **have** also **prevented them from considering the stark reality of contemporary class conditions under global capitalism**. As we hope to show, the radical displacement of class analysis in contemporary theoretical narratives and the concomitant decentering of capitalism, the anointing of ‘difference’ as a primary explanatory construct, and the ‘culturalization’ of politics, have had detrimental effects on ‘left’ theory and practice. Reconceptualizing ‘Difference’ The manner in which ‘difference’ has been taken up within ‘post-al’ frameworks has tended to stress its cultural dimensions while marginalizing and, in some cases, completely ignoring the economic and material dimensions of difference. This posturing has been quite evident in many ‘post-al’ theories of ‘race’ and in the realm of ‘ludic’1 cultural studies that have valorized an account of difference—particularly ‘racial difference’—in almost exclusively ‘superstructuralist’ terms (Sahay, 1998). But this treatment of ‘difference’ and **claims about ‘the** “relative **autonomy” of “race”’ have been ‘enabled by a** reduction and **distortion of Marxian class analysis’** which ‘involves equating class analysis with some version of economic determinism.’ **The key move in this distorting gesture depends on the ‘view that the economic is the base, the cultural**/political/ideological **the superstructure.’ It is then** ‘relatively **easy to show that the** (presumably non-political) economic **base does not cause the** political/cultural/ideological **superstructure, that the latter is**/are not epiphenomenal but relatively **autonomous** or autonomous causal categories’ (Meyerson, 2000, p. 2). In such formulations **the ‘cultural’ is treated as a separate** and autonomous **sphere**, severed from its embeddedness within sociopolitical and economic arrangements. As a result, many of **these** ‘culturalist’ **narratives have produced autonomist** and reiﬁed **conceptualizations of difference which** ‘far from enabling those subjects most marginalized by racial difference’ **have**, in effect**, reduced ‘difference to a question of knowledge/power relations’ that can presumably be ‘dealt with** (negotiated) **on a discursive level without a fundamental change in the relations of production**’ (Sahay, 1998). At this juncture, it is necessary to point out that **arguing that ‘culture’ is** generally conditioned/**shaped by material forces** does not reinscribe the simplistic and presumably ‘deterministic**’** base/superstructure metaphor **which** has plagued some strands of Marxist theory. **Rather, we** invoke Marx’s own writings from both the Grundrisse and Capital in which he contends that there is a consolidating logic in the relations of production that permeates society in the complex variety of its ‘empirical’ reality. This **emphasizes** Marx’s understanding of **capitalism and capital as a ‘social’ relation**—one which stresses the interpenetration of these categories, the realities which they reﬂect, and **one which** therefore **offers a uniﬁed** and dialectical **analysis of history, ideology**, **culture**, politics**, economics and society** (~~see~~ also Marx, 1972, 1976, 1977).2 Foregrounding the limitations of ‘difference’ and ‘representational’ politics does not suggest a disavowal of the importance of cultural and/or discursive arena(s) as sites of contestation and struggle. We readily acknowledge the signiﬁcance of contemporary theorizations that have sought to valorize precisely those forms of ‘**difference’** that have historically been denigrated. This has undoubtedly been an important development since they have enabled subordinated groups to reconstruct their own histories and give voice to their individual and collective identities. However, they **have** also **tended to redeﬁne politics as a signifying activity generally conﬁned to the realm of ‘representation’ while displacing a politics grounded in the mobilization of forces against the material sources of political and economic marginalization**. In their rush to avoid the ‘capital’ sin of ‘economism,’ many **post-Marxists** (who often **ignore their own class privilege**) **have fallen prey to an ahistorical form of culturalism which holds**, among other things, **that cultural struggles external to class organizing provide the cutting edge of emancipatory politics**.3 In many respects, **this posturing, has yielded an ‘intellectual pseudopolitics’ that has served to empower ‘the theorist while explicitly disempowering’ real citizens** (Turner, 1994, p. 410). We do not discount concerns over representation; rather our point is that progressive educators and theorists should not be straightjacketed by struggles that fail to move beyond the politics of difference and representation in the cultural realm. While space limitations prevent us from elaborating this point, we contend that **culturalist arguments are** deeply **problematic** **both in terms of their penchant for de-emphasizing the totalizing** (yes totalizing**!) power and function of capital and for their attempts to employ culture as a construct that would diminish the centrality of class**. In a proper historical materialist account, ‘**culture’ is not the ‘other’ of class but, rather, constitutes part of a more comprehensive theorization of class rule in different contexts**.4 ‘Post-al’ theorizations of ‘difference’ circumvent and undermine any systematic knowledge of the material dimensions of difference and tend to segregate questions of ‘difference’ from class formation and capitalist social relations. We therefore believe that **it is necessary to (re)conceptualize ‘difference’ by drawing upon Marx’s materialist and historical formulations**. ‘**Difference’ needs to be understood as the product of social contradictions** and **in relation to political and economic organization**. We need to acknowledge that ‘**otherness’** and/or difference **is not something that passively happens, but, rather, is actively produced**. In other words, since **systems of differences almost always involve relations of domination and oppression, we must concern ourselves with the economies of relations of difference that exist in speciﬁc contexts**. Drawing upon the Marxist concept of mediation enables us to unsettle our categorical approaches to both class and difference, for it was Marx himself who warned against creating false dichotomies in the situation of our politics—that it was absurd to ‘choose between consciousness and the world, subjectivity and social organization, personal or collective will and historical or structural determination.’ In a similar vein, **it is** equally **absurd to ~~see~~ ‘difference as a historical form of consciousness unconnected to class formation**, development of capital and class politics’ (Bannerji, 1995, p. 30). Bannerji points to the need to historicize ‘difference’ in relation to the history and social organization of capital and class (inclusive of imperialist and colonialist legacies). **Apprehending the** meaning and **function of difference** in this manner necessarily **highlights the importance of exploring** (1**) the institutional and structural aspects of difference**; (2) the meanings that get attached to categories of difference; and (3) **how differences are produced** out of, and lived **within** **speciﬁc historical formations**.5 Moreover, **it presents a challenge to those theorizations that work to consolidate ‘identitarian’ understandings of difference based exclusively on questions of** cultural or racial **hegemony. In such approaches, the answer to oppression** often **amounts to creating greater cultural space** **for the** formerly **excluded to have their voices** heard (**represented**). In this regard, much of what is called **the ‘politics of difference’ is** little more **than a demand for inclusion into the club of representation** —a posture **which reinscribes a neo-liberal pluralist stance rooted in the ideology of free-market capitalism.** In short, **the political sphere is modeled on the marketplace and freedom amounts to the liberty of all vendors to display their ‘different’ cultural goods.** What advocates of **this approach fail to address** is that **the forces of diversity** and difference **are allowed to ﬂourish** **provided that they remain within the prevailing forms of capitalist social arrangements**. The **neopluralism of difference** politics (including those based on ‘race’) **cannot** adequately **pose a substantive challenge to the productive system of capitalism** that is able to accommodate a vast pluralism of ideas and cultural practices, **and cannot capture the ways in which various manifestations** **of oppression are** intimately **connected to the central dynamics of** capitalist **exploitation**. An historical materialist approach understands that categories of ‘difference’ are social/political constructs that are often encoded in dominant ideological formations and that they often play a role in ‘moral’ and ‘legal’ state-mediated forms of ruling. It also acknowledges the ‘material’ force of ideologies—particularly racist ideologies—that assign separate cultural and/or biological essences to different segments of the population which, in turn, serve to reinforce and rationalize existing relations of power. But more than this, an historical materialist understanding foregrounds the manner in which ‘difference’ is central to the exploitative production/ reproduction dialectic of capital, its labor organization and processes, and in the way labor is valued and renumerated.

**Even if they win the historical question of 'what came first', the question you should default to is: what system reproduces the violence they criticize? Capitalism is that system.**

**Ollman** **89** (Bertell, 1989 Professor of Politics at NYU, “In Defense of Marxism,” May, http://www.nyu.edu/projects/ollman/docs/marxism\_defense.php)

First, and most important, Albert and Bookchin seriously misconstrue the nature of Marx's subject, what he was studying, and consequently what most of his theories are about. According to Albert and Bookchin (and, of course, they aren't alone in this), Marxism is about society, each and every society and the rules that govern them. Viewed in this manner, capitalism is but Marx's most important illustration for the working out of these rules. The truth, however, is the other way around. **Marx's major theories deal essentially with capitalism**, with how it works, for whom it works better and for whom it works worse, where it has come from and where it seems to be heading. **Certain generalizations can be lifted from this effort**, to which Marx devoted the greater part of his writings, and used to help us understand non-capitalist societies and non-social phenomena, but we should not wonder at the incomplete character of such accounts. **Marx's theories**, for example, **cannot adequately explain the origins of patriarchy or the function of religion, nationalism, racism, sexism and the workings of the economy in non-capitalist class societies**, or the carry over of these functions and some of their effects into the capitalist period—nor should we expect them to. (**Marx's dialectical method, on the other hand, can prove very helpful in extending our understanding to these areas**). Secondly, as regards capitalism, Marx's theories are chiefly concerned with mapping an evolving context that establishes both the broad limits and variety of possibilities (stressing what is most likely) for what can go on in it. This analysis is constructed for the most part out of two overlapping accounts, that of capital accumulation (the growth and development of the means by which wealth is produced in our era) and that of class struggle (the history of the accompanying social relations). The emphasis on economic conditions is due to the fact that what is most distinctive about this context is of an economic nature, though this must be understood in a very broad sense. (This is what Albert caricatures as Marx's "productivist bias"). Third, as a dialectical thinker, Marx cannot offer any factor, no matter how important, as a first or only cause. Whatever is treated as having a major or special effect, and these are usually—though not always—economic conditions and events, they themselves are never wholly isolated from the broader conditions out of what they arose and which continue to act and interact alongside them. (This is what Albert caricatures as "reductivism"). The trick, of course, is to sacrifice neither that multiplicity of causes for whatever deserves greater or special emphasis (as vulgar economic determinists often do) or the latter for the former (as like Albert and some other social movement theorists do). Fourth, the various non-class dominations of special concern to social movements people have both capitalist and non-capitalist components. Marxist inspired revolutions, therefore, cannot be expected to completely eradicate any of them, at least in the short run. So why should people involved in the social movements be interested in Marxism? Well—because most of them/us are also workers (white collar as well as blue collar), and **Marxism is invaluable in helping to develop a strategy that serves their/our interests as workers. Because the other forms of domination from which they/we suffer all have a capitalist component, and Marxism best explains it. Because even those parts of these oppressions that are older than capitalism have acquired a capitalist form and function**, so that a Marxist analysis of capitalism is required to distinguish what is historically specific in their operation from what is not. And, lastly, because **overturning capitalism is the necessary** (though not sufficient) **condition for doing away with all forms of domination, including domination over nature, and only a class conscious working class has the numbers (still), the power (potentially), and the interests (always) to bring about a change of this magnitude**. Hence, the priority Marxists give to class analysis and class based politics (which does not rule out organizing around other oppressions at specific times for specific purposes). **The priority given to class** here (not to "the workers" but to "us as workers") **has nothing to do with who is hurting more** or which form of oppression is more immoral or which dominated group happens to be in motion, **and everything to do with what is the adequate framework and vantage point for grasping the specific manner in which all these oppressions are interacting now and how best to get rid of them all**. (And this is what Albert caricatures as a "master discourse"). I do not expect that simply making these claims has convinced anyone that they are right, but I hope they help clarify where the real disagreements between Marxist and social movement theorists lie, and, hence, what is worth discussing if we are ever to construct the united movement that is needed to achieve our—yes!—common goals.

We have an ethical obligation to resist global capitalism

**Daly 4** (Glyn, Risking The Impossible) http://www.lacan.com/zizek-daly.htm, 2004)

For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gordian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today's global capitalism and its obscene naturalization/anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture - with all its pieties concerning "multiculturalist" [6](http://lacan.com/zizek-daly.htm#6) etiquette - Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called "radically incorrect" in the sense that it breaks with these types of positions [7](http://lacan.com/zizek-daly.htm#7) and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today's social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. For far too long, Marxism has been bedeviled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political morbidity With the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci, and move recently Laclau and Mouffe, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of implicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian- Lacanian twist, the few of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibition conjures up the very thing it fears). This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek's point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the fives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx's central insight that in order to create a universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals; such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose "universalism" fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world's population. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgement in a neutral marketplace. Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded "life-chances" cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and nameless (viz. the patronizing reference to the "developing world"). And Zizek's point is that this mystification is magnified through capitalism's profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect (or misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differential affirmation. Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily sustained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle. Against this Zizek argues for a new universalism whose primary ethical directive is to confront the fact that our forms of social existence are founded on exclusion on a global scale. While it is perfectly true that universalism can never become Universal (it will always require a hegemonic-particular embodiment in order to have any meaning), what is novel about Zizek's universalism is that it would not attempt to conceal this fact or to reduce the status of the abject Other to that of a "glitch" in an otherwise sound matrix.

**Capitalism is the root cause of militarized American foreign policy**

**Foster 6** (John Bellamy, Prof of Sociology @ U of Oregon, “A Warning to Africa: The New U.S. Grand Strategy” Monthly Review Vol. 58.2 June JF)

U.S. imperial grand strategy is less a product of policies generated in Washington by this or that wing of the ruling class, than an inevitable result of the power position that U.S. capitalism finds itself in at the commencement of the twenty-first century. U.S. economic strength (along with that of its closest allies) has been ebbing fairly steadily. The great powers are not likely to ~~stand~~ in the same relation to each other economically two decades hence. At the same time U.S. world military power has increased relatively with the demise of the Soviet Union. The United States now accounts for about half of all of the world’s military spending—a proportion two or more times its share of world output. The goal of the new U.S. imperial grand strategy is to use this unprecedented military strength to preempt emerging historical forces by creating a sphere of full-spectrum dominance so vast, now encompassing every continent, that no potential rivals will be able to challenge the United States decades down the line. This is a war against the peoples of the periphery of the capitalist world and for the expansion of world capitalism, particularly U.S. capitalism. But it is also a war to secure a “New American Century” in which third world nations are viewed as “strategic assets” within a larger global geopolitical struggle. The lessons of history are clear: attempts to gain world dominance by military means, though inevitable under capitalism, are destined to fail and can only lead to new and greater wars. It is the responsibility of those committed to world peace to resist the new U.S. imperial grand strategy by calling into question imperialism and its economic taproot: capitalism itself.

**Our alternative is to return the priority of political contestation to class. The aim of our alternative makes the production of social relations, capitalism and class, the starting point for resistance and criticism.**

**McLaren & D'Anniable 4** - (Peter, Valerie Scatamburlo, Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2004, © 2004 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia April 2004, Class Dismissed? Historical materialism and the politics of ‘difference)

The real problem is the internal or dialectical relation that exists between capital and labor within the capitalist production process itself—a social relation in which capitalism is intransigently rooted. This social relation—essential to the production of abstract labor—deals with how already existing value is preserved and new value (surplus value) is created (Allman, 2001). If, for example, the process of actual exploitation and the accumulation of surplus value is to be ~~seen~~ as a state of constant manipulation and as a realization process of concrete labor in actual labor time—within a given cost-production system and a labor market—we cannot underestimate the ways in which ‘difference’ (racial as well as gender difference) is encapsulated in the production/reproduction dialectic of capital. It is this relationship that is mainly responsible for the inequitable and unjust distribution of resources. A deepened understanding of this phenomenon is essential for understanding the emergence of an acutely polarized labor market and the fact that **disproportionately high percentages of ‘people of color’ are trapped in the lower rungs of domestic and global labor markets** (McLaren & Farahmandpur, 1999**). ‘Difference’ in the era of global capitalism is crucial to the** workings, movements and **proﬁt levels of multinational corporations** but those types of complex relations cannot be mapped out by using truncated post-Marxist, culturalist conceptualizations of ‘difference.’ **To sever issues of ‘difference’ from class** conveniently **draws attention away from the crucially important ways in which ‘people of color’** (and, more speciﬁcally, ‘women of color’) **provide capital with its superexploited labor pools**—a phenomenon that is on the rise all over the world. Most social **relations** constitutive **of racialized differences are** considerably **shaped by the relations of production** and there is undoubtedly a racialized and gendered division of labor whose severity and function vary depending on where one is situated in the capitalist global economy (Meyerson, 2000).6 In stating this, we need to include an important caveat that differentiates our approach from those invoking the well-worn race/class/gender triplet which can sound, to the uninitiated, both radical and vaguely Marxian. It is not. **Race, class and gender, while they** invariably **intersect and interact, are not co-primary**. This ‘triplet’ approximates what the ‘philosophers might call a category mistake.’ **On the surface the triplet may be convincing**—some people are oppressed because of their race, others as a result of their gender, yet others because of their class—**but this ‘is grossly misleading’** for it is not that ‘some individuals manifest certain characteristics known as “class” which then results in their oppression; **on the contrary, to be a member of a social class** just **is to be oppressed’ and in this regard class is ‘a wholly social category’** (Eagleton, 1998, p. 289). Furthermore, even though ‘**class’** is usually invoked as part of the aforementioned and much vaunted triptych, it **is usually gutted of its practical**, **social dimension** or treated solely as a cultural phenomenon—as just another form of ‘difference.’ In these instances, class is **transformed** from an economic and, indeed, social category **to an exclusively** cultural or **discursive one** or one **in which class merely signiﬁes a ‘subject position.**’ **Class is therefore cut off from the political economy of capitalism** and class power severed from exploitation and a power structure ‘in which those who control collectively produced resources only do so because of the value generated by those who do not’ (Hennessy & Ingraham, 1997, p. 2). Such theorizing has had the effect of replacing an historical materialist class analysis with a cultural analysis of class. As a result, many post-Marxists have also stripped the idea of class of precisely that element which, for Marx, made it radical—namely its status as a universal form of exploitation whose abolition required (and was also central to) the abolition of all manifestations of oppression (Marx, 1978, p. 60). With regard to this issue, Kovel (2002) is particularly insightful, for he explicitly addresses an issue which continues to vex the Left—namely **the priority given to different categories of** what he calls ‘**dominative splitting**’—those categories of ‘gender, class, race, ethnic and national exclusion,’ etc. **Kovel argues that we need to ask the question of priority with respect to what**? He notes that if we mean priority with respect to time, then the category of gender would have priority since there are traces of gender oppression in all other forms of oppression. If we were to prioritize in terms of existential signiﬁcance, Kovel suggests that we would have to depend upon the immediate historical forces that bear down on distinct groups of people—he offers examples of Jews in 1930s Germany who suffered from brutal forms of anti-Semitism and Palestinians today who experience anti-Arab racism under Israeli domination. **The question of what has political priority**, however, would **depend upon which transformation of relations of oppression are practically more urgent and,** while this **would certainly depend upon the preceding categories**, it would also depend upon the fashion in which all the forces acting in a concrete situation are deployed. **As to the question of which split sets into motion all of the others, the priority would have to be given to class since class relations entail the state as an instrument of enforcement and control, and it is the state that shapes and organizes the splits that appear in human ecosystems.** Thus **class is** both logically and **historically distinct from other forms of exclusion (**hence we should not talk of ‘classism’ to go along with ‘sexism’ and ‘racism,’ and ‘species-ism’). This is, ﬁrst of all, because **class is a**n essentially **(hu)man-made category, without root in even a mystiﬁed biology. We cannot imagine a human world without gender distinctions—although we can imagine a world without domination** by gender. **But a world without class is** eminently **imaginable**—indeed, such was the human world for the great majority of our species’ time on earth, during all of which considerable fuss was made over gender. Historically, the difference arises because ‘**class’ signiﬁes** one side of a larger ﬁgure that includes **a state apparatus whose conquests and regulations create races and shape gender relations.** Thus there will be no true resolution of racism so long as class society ~~stands~~, inasmuch as a racially oppressed society implies the activities of a class-defending state. Nor can gender inequality be enacted away so long as class society, with its state, demands the super-exploitation of women’s labor. (Kovel, 2002, pp. 123–124) Contrary to what many have claimed, **Marxist theory does not relegate categories of ‘difference’ to the conceptual mausoleum; rather, it has sought to reanimate these categories by interrogating how they are refracted through material relations of power and privilege and linked to relations of production**. Moreover, it has emphasized and insisted that the wider political and economic system in which they are embedded needs to be thoroughly understood in all its complexity. Indeed, Marx made clear how constructions of race and ethnicity ‘are implicated in the circulation process of variable capital.’ To the extent that ‘**gender, race, and ethnicity are all** understood as **social constructions rather than** as **essentialist categories’** the effect of exploring their insertion into the ‘circulation of variable capital (including positioning within the internal heterogeneity of collective labor and hence, within the division of labor and the class system)’ must be interpreted as a ‘powerful force reconstructing them in distinctly capitalist ways’ (Harvey, 2000, p. 106). **Unlike contemporary narratives which tend to focus on one** or another f**orm of oppression, the irrefragable power of historical materialism resides in its ability to reveal (**1) **how forms of oppression based on categories of difference do not possess relative autonomy from class relations but rather constitute the ways in which oppression is lived/experienced within a class-based system; and** (2**) how all forms of social oppression function within an overarching capitalist system.** This framework must be further distinguished from those that invoke the terms ‘classism’ and/or ‘class elitism’ to (ostensibly) foreground the idea that ‘class matters’ (cf. hooks, 2000) since we agree with Gimenez (2001, p. 24) that ‘class is not simply another ideology legitimating oppression.’ Rather**, class denotes ‘exploitative relations between people mediated by their relations to the means of production**.’ To marginalize such a conceptualization of class is to conﬂate an individual’s objective location in the intersection of structures of inequality with people’s subjective understandings of who they really are based on their ‘experiences.’ Another caveat. In making such a claim, we are not renouncing the concept of experience. On the contrary, we believe it is imperative to retain the category of lived experience as a reference point in light of misguided post-Marxist critiques which imply that all forms of Marxian class analysis are dismissive of subjectivity. **We are not**, however, **advocating the uncritical fetishization of ‘experience’ that tends to assume that experience somehow guarantees the authenticity of knowledge and which often treats experience as self-explanatory, transparent**, and solely individual. Rather**, we advance a framework that seeks to make connections between seemingly isolated situations and/or particular experiences by exploring how they are constituted in, and circumscribed by, broader historical and social circumstances.** Experiential understandings, in and of themselves, are suspect because, dialectically, they constitute a unity of opposites—they are at once unique, speciﬁc, and personal, but also thoroughly partial, social, and the products of historical forces about which individuals may know little or nothing (Gimenez, 2001). In this sense, a rich description of **immediate experience** in terms of consciousness of a particular form of oppression (racial or otherwise) can be an appropriate and indispensable point of departure. Such an understanding, however, **can** easily **become an isolated ‘difference’ prison** **unless it transcends the** immediate **perceived point of oppression, confronts the social system in which it is rooted, and expands into a complex and multifaceted analysis** (of forms of social mediation) **that is capable of mapping out the general organization of social relations.** **That**, however, **requires a** broad **class-based approach**. Having a concept of **class helps us to ~~see~~ the network of social relations constituting** an overall **social organization** which both implicates and cuts through racialization/ethnicization and gender … [a] radical political economy [class] perspective emphasizing exploitation, dispossession and survival takes the issues of … diversity [and difference] beyond questions of conscious identity such as culture and ideology, or of a paradigm of homogeneity and heterogeneity … or of ethical imperatives with respect to the ‘other’. (Bannerji, 2000, pp. 7, 19) A radical political economy framework is crucial since various ‘culturalist’ perspectives seem to diminish the role of political economy and class forces in shaping the ediﬁce of ‘the social’—including the shifting constellations and meanings of ‘difference.’ Furthermore, none of the ‘differences’ valorized in culturalist narratives alone, and certainly not ‘race’ by itself can explain the massive transformation of the structure of capitalism in recent years. We agree with Meyerson (2000) that ‘race’ is not an adequate explanatory category on its own and that the use of ‘race’ as a descriptive or analytical category has serious consequences for the way in which social life is presumed to be constituted and organized. The category of ‘race’—the conceptual framework that the oppressed often employ to interpret their experiences of inequality ‘often clouds the concrete reality of class, and blurs the actual structure of power and privilege.’ In this regard, ‘**race’ is all too often a ‘barrier to understanding the central role of class in shaping personal and collective outcomes within a capitalist society’** (Marable, 1995, pp. 8, 226). In many ways, the use of ‘race’ has become an analytical trap precisely when it has been employed in antiseptic isolation from the messy terrain of historical and material relations. **This**, of course, **does not** **imply that we ignore racism** and racial oppression; **rather, an analytical shift from ‘race’ to a plural conceptualization of ‘racisms’ and their historical articulations is necessary** (cf. McLaren & Torres, 1999). However, it is important to note that **‘race’ doesn’t explain racism** and forms of racial oppression. **Those relations are best understood within the context of class rule,** as Bannerji, Kovel, Marable and Meyerson imply—but that compels us to forge a conceptual shift in theorizing, which entails (among other things) moving beyond the ideology of ‘difference’ and ‘race’ as the dominant prisms for understanding exploitation and oppression. We are aware of some potential implications for white Marxist criticalists to unwittingly support racist practices in their criticisms of ‘race-ﬁrst’ positions articulated in the social sciences. In those instances, white criticalists wrongly go on ‘high alert’ in placing theorists of color under special surveillance for downplaying an analysis of capitalism and class. These activities on the part of white criticalists must be condemned, as must be efforts to stress class analysis primarily as a means of creating a white vanguard position in the struggle against capitalism. **Our position is one that attempts to link practices of racial oppression to the central, totalizing dynamics of capitalist society** in order to resist white supremacist capitalist patriarchy more fully.7

**The revolution is not a choice – the insurrection is coming, stoked by its own revolutionary impulse. The only choice is how we align ourselves. A negative ballot acts as an entrenchment against the empire – to resonate the revolutionary rhythm in the pedagogical sphere and herald a new era**

**The IC** **9** - French Terrorists **(The Coming Insurrection)**

Revolutionary movements do not spread by contamination but by resonance. Something that is constituted here resonates with the shock wave emitted by something constituted over there. A body that resonates does so according to its own mode. An insurrection is not like a plague or a forest fire—a linear process which spreads from place to place after an initial spark. It rather takes the shape of a music, whose focal points, though dispersed in time and space, succeed in imposing the rhythm of their own vibrations, always taking on more density, to the point that any return to normal is no longer desirable or even imaginable. When we speak of Empire we name the mechanisms of power that preventively and surgically stifle any revolutionary potential in a situation. In this sense, Empire is not an enemy that confronts us head-on. It is a rhythm that imposes itself, a way of dispensing and dispersing reality. Less an order of the world than its sad, heavy and militaristic liquidation. What we mean by the party of insurgents is the sketching out of a completely other composition, an other side of reality, which from Greece to the French banlieues is seeking its consistency. It is now publicly understood that crisis situations are so many opportunities for the restructuring of domination. This is why Sarkozy can announce, without seeming to lie too much, that the financial crisis is "the end of a world," and that 2009 will ~~see~~ France enter a new era. This charade of an economic crisis is supposed to be a novelty: we are supposed to be in the dawn of a new epoch where we will all join together in fighting inequality and global warming. But for our generation—which was born in the crisis and has known nothing but economic, financial, social and ecological crisis—this is rather difficult to accept. They won't fool us again, with another round of "Now we start all over again" and "It's just a question of tightening our belts for a little while." To tell the truth, the disastrous unemployment figures no longer arouse any feeling in us. Crisis is a means of governing. In a world that seems to hold together only through the infinite management of its own collapse. What this war is being fought over is not various ways of managing society, but irreducible and irreconcilable ideas of happiness and their worlds. We know it, and so do the powers that be. The militant remnants that observe us—always more numerous, always more identifiable—are tearing out their hair trying to fit us into little compartments in their little heads. They hold out their arms to us the better to suffocate us, with their failures, their ~~paralysis~~, their stupid problematics. From elections to "transitions," militants will never be anything other than that which distances us, each time a little farther, from the possibility of communism. Luckily we will accommodate neither treason nor deception for much longer. The past has given us far too many bad answers for us not to ~~see~~ that the mistakes were in the questions themselves. There is no need to choose between the fetishism of spontaneity and organizational control; between the "come one, come all" of activist networks and the discipline of hierarchy; between acting desperately now and waiting desperately for later; between bracketing that which is to be lived and experimented in the name of a paradise that seems more and more like a hell the longer it is put off, and repeating, with a corpse-filled mouth, that planting carrots is enough to dispel this nightmare. Organizations are obstacles to organizing ourselves. In truth, there is no gap between what we are, what we do, and what we are becoming. Organizations— political or labor, fascist or anarchist—always begin by separating, practically, these aspects of existence. It's then easy for them to present their idiotic formalism as the sole remedy to this separation. To organize is not to give a structure to weakness. It is above all to form bonds—bonds that are by no means neutral—terrible bonds. The degree of organization is measured by the intensity of sharing—material and spiritual. From now on, to materially organize for survival is to materially organize for attack. Everywhere, a new idea of communism is to be elaborated. In the shadows of bar rooms, in print shops, squats, farms, occupied gymnasiums, new complicities are to be born. These precious connivances must not be refused the necessary means for the deployment of their forces. Here lies the truly revolutionary potentiality of the present. The increasingly frequent skirmishes have this formidable quality: that they are always an occasion for complicities of this type, sometimes ephemeral, but sometimes also unbetrayable. When a few thousand young people find the determination to assail this world, you'd have to be as stupid as a cop to seek out a financial trail, a leader, or a snitch. Two centuries of capitalism and market nihilism have brought us to the most extreme alienations—from our selves, from others, from worlds. The fiction of the individual has decomposed at the same speed that it was becoming real. Children of the metropolis, we offer this wager: that it's in the most profound deprivation of existence, perpetually stifled, perpetually conjured away, that the possibility of communism resides. When all is said and done, it's with an entire anthropology that we are at war, with the very idea of man. Communism then, as presupposition and as experiment, sharing of a sensibility and elaboration of sharing, the uncovering of what is common and the building of a force, communism as the matrix of a meticulous, audacious assault on domination, as a call and as a name for all worlds resisting imperial pacification, all solidarities irreducible to the reign of commodities, all friendships assuming the necessities of war. COMMUNISM. We know it's a term to be used with caution. Not because, in die great parade of words, it may no longer be very fashionable. But because our worst enemies have used it, and continue to do so. We insist. Certain words are like battlegrounds: their meaning, revolutionary or reactionary, is a victory, to be torn from the jaws of struggle. Deserting classical politics means facing up to war, which is also situated on the terrain of language. Or rather, in the way that words, gestures and life are inseparably linked. If one puts so much effort into imprisoning as terrorists a few young communists who are supposed to have participated in publishing The Coming Insurrection, it is not because of a "thought crime," but rather because they might embody a certain consistency between acts and thought. Something which is rarely treated with leniency. What these people are accused of is not to have written a book, nor even to have physically attacked the sacrosanct flows that irrigate the metropolis. It's that they might possibly have confronted these flows with the density of a political thought and position. That an act could have made sense according to another consistency of the world than the deserted one of Empire. Anti-terrorism claims to attack the possible future of a "criminal association." But what is really being attacked is the future of the situation. The possibility that behind every grocer a few bad intentions are hiding, and behind every thought, the acts that it calls for. The possibility expressed by an idea of politics—anonymous but welcoming, contagious and uncontrollable—which cannot be relegated to the storeroom of freedom of expression. There remains scarcely any doubt that youth will be the first to savagely confront power. These last few years, from the riots of Spring 2001 in Algeria to those of December 2008 in Greece, are nothing but a series of warning signs in this regard. Those who 30 or 40 years ago revolted against their parents will not hesitate to reduce this to a conflict between generations, if not to a predictable symptom of adolescence. The only future of a "generation" is to be the preceding one. On a route that leads inevitably to the cemetery. Tradition would have it that everything begins with a "social movement." Especially at a moment when the left, which has still not finished decomposing, hypocritically tries to regain its credibility in the streets. Except that in the streets it no longer has a monopoly. Just look at how, with each new mobilization of high school students—as with everything the left still dares to support—a rift continually widens between their whining demands and the level of violence and determination of the movement. From this rift we must make a trench. If we ~~see~~ a succession of movements hurrying one after the other, without leaving anything visible behind them, it must nonetheless be admitted that something persists. A powder trail links what in each event has not let itself be captured by the absurd temporality of the withdrawal of a new law, or some other pretext. In fits and starts, and in its own rhythm, we are seeing something like a force take shape. A force that does not serve its time but imposes it, silently. It is no longer a matter of foretelling the collapse or depicting the possibilities of joy. Whether it comes sooner or later, the point is to prepare for it. It's not a question of providing a schema for what an insurrection should be, but of taking the possibility of an uprising for what it never should have ceased being: a vital impulse of youth as much as a popular wisdom. If one knows how to move, the absence of a schema is not an obstacle but an opportunity. For the insurgents, it is the sole space that can guarantee the essential: keeping the initiative. What remains to be created, to be tended as one tends a fire, is a certain outlook, a certain tactical fever, which once it has emerged, even now, reveals itself as determinant—and a constant source of determination. Already certain questions have been revived that only yesterday may have seemed grotesque or outmoded; they need to be seized upon, not in order to respond to them definitively, but to make them live. Having posed them anew is not the least of the Greek uprising's virtues: How does a situation of generalized rioting become an insurrectionary situation? What to do once the streets have been taken, once the police have been soundly defeated there? Do the parliaments still deserve to be attacked? What is the practical meaning of deposing power locally? How do we decide? How do we subsist? How do we find each other?

### Case

The 1AC is an object that speaks for ITSELF - voting for the affirmative is NOT voting for the 1ac, vote negative on presumption.

Bryant 12 - Professor of Philosophy at Collin College (Levi R., Author of a number of articles on Deleuze, Badiou, Zizek, Lacan, and political theory, July 24th, 2012, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/07/24/radical-ethnography-or-situated-knowledge-a-response-to-a-friend/)

Your tone here sounds a bit irritated. I hope I didn’t provoke that as it wasn’t my intention. I don’t think I understood your point, but genuinely disagree with you. While I readily acknowledge that the cave painters were the cause of the paintings, I strongly disagree that the painters are a part of the being of the painting. Just as ones parents are the cause of one’s being while nonetheless the child is an autonomous being, the painting is an autonomous beings that have its own power that exceed any particular cultural or historical context. I don’t disagree that the question of what the paintings were for the cave painters is an interesting and important one, but in raising that question we’ve entered into a new machinic relation and are no longer talking about the paintings for themselves as autonomous entities that circulate throughout the world beyond their origins. What they were for a particular group is an important issue. My only point is that no work can ever be reduced– nor any entity, for that matter –can be reduced to what it is for another entity.

#### The artist is dead - attempting to couple the speech act of the 1ac with the affirmative empties the world of all meaning and makes life dull and tame.

Sontag 66 (Susan, Against Interpretation, http://www.uiowa.edu/~c08g001d/Sontag\_AgainstInterp.pdf)

The fact is, all Western consciousness of and reflection upon art have remained within the confines staked out by the Greek theory of art as mimesis or representation. It is through this theory that art as such - above and beyond given works of art - becomes problematic, in need of defense. And it is the defense of art which gives birth to the odd vision by which something we have learned to call "form"is separated off from something we have learned to call "content," and to the well-intentioned move which makes content essential and form accessory. Even in modern times, when most artists and critics have discarded the theory of art as representation of an outer reality in favor of the theory of art as subjective expression, the main feature of the mimetic theory persists. Whether we conceive of the work of art on the model of a picture (art as a picture of reality) or on the model of a statement (art as the statement of the artist), content still comes first. The content may have changed. It may now be less figurative, less lucidly realistic. But it is still assumed that a work of art is its content. Or, as it's usually put today, that a work of art by definition says something. ("What X is saying is . . . ," "What X is trying to say is . . . ," "What X said is . . ." etc., etc.) 2 None of us can ever retrieve that innocence before all theory when art knew no need to justify itself, when one did not ask of a work of art what it said because one knew (or thought one knew) what it did. From now to the end of consciousness, we are stuck with the task of defending art. We can only quarrel with one or another means of defense. Indeed, we have an obligation to overthrow any means of defending and justifying art which becomes particularly obtuse or onerous or insensitive to contemporary needs and practice. This is the case, today, with the very idea of content itself. Whatever it may have been in the past, the idea of content is today mainly a hindrance, a nuisance, a subtle or not so subtle philistinism. Though the actual developments in many arts may seem to be leading us away from the idea that a work of art is primarily its content, the idea still exerts an extraordinary hegemony. I want to suggest that this is because the idea is now perpetuated in the guise of a certain way of encountering works of art thoroughly ingrained among most people who take any of the arts seriously. What the overemphasis on the idea of content entails is the perennial, never consummated project of interpretation. And, conversely, it is the habit of approaching works of art in order to interpret them that sustains the fancy that there really is such a thing as the content of a work of art. 3 Of course, I don't mean interpretation in the broadest sense, the sense in which Nietzsche (rightly) says, "There are no facts, only interpretations." By interpretation, I mean here a conscious act of the mind which illustrates a certain code, certain "rules" of interpretation. Directed to art, interpretation means plucking a set of elements (the X, the Y, the Z, and so forth) from the whole work. The task of interpretation is virtually one of translation. The interpreter says, Look, don't you ~~see~~ that X is really - or, really means - A? That Y is really B? That Z is really C? What situation could prompt this curious project for transforming a text? History gives us the materials for an answer. Interpretation first appears in the culture of late classical antiquity, when the power and credibility of myth had been broken by the "realistic" view of the world introduced by scientific enlightenment. Once the question that haunts post-mythic consciousness - that of the seemliness of religious symbols - had been asked, the ancient texts were, in their pristine form, no longer acceptable. Then interpretation was summoned, to reconcile the ancient texts to "modern" demands. Thus, the Stoics, to accord with their view that the gods had to be moral, allegorized away the rude features of Zeus and his boisterous clan in Homer's epics. What Homer really designated by the adultery of Zeus with Leto, they explained, was the union between power and wisdom. In the same vein, Philo of Alexandria interpretedthe literal historical narratives of the Hebrew Bible as spiritual paradigms. The story of the exodus from Egypt, the wandering in the desert for forty years, and the entry into the promised land, said Philo, was really an allegory of the individual soul's emancipation, tribulations, and final deliverance. Interpretation thus presupposes a discrepancy between the clear meaning of the text and the demands of (later) readers. It seeks to resolve that discrepancy. The situation is that for some reason a text has become unacceptable; yet it cannot be discarded. Interpretation is a radical strategy for conserving an old text, which is thought too precious to repudiate, by revamping it. The interpreter, without actually erasing or rewriting the text, is altering it. But he can't admit to doing this. He claims to be only making it intelligible, by disclosing its true meaning. However far the interpreters alter the text (another notorious example is the Rabbinic and Christian "spiritual" interpretations of the clearly erotic Song of Songs), they must claim to be reading off a sense that is already there. Interpretation in our own time, however, is even more complex. For the contemporary zeal for the project of interpretation is often prompted not by piety toward the troublesome text (which may conceal an aggression), but by an open aggressiveness, an overt contempt for appearances. The old style of interpretation was insistent, but respectful; it erected another meaning on top of the literal one. The modern style of interpretation excavates, and as it excavates, destroys; it digs "behind" the text, to find a sub-text which is the true one. The most celebrated and influential modern doctrines, those of Marx and Freud, actually amount to elaborate systems of hermeneutics, aggressive and impious theories of interpretation. All observable phenomena are bracketed, in Freud's phrase, as manifest content. This manifest content must be probed and pushed aside to find the true meaning - the latent content - beneath. For Marx, social events like revolutions and wars; for Freud, the events of individual lives (like neurotic symptoms and slips of the tongue) as well as texts (like a dream or a work of art) - all are treated as occasions for interpretation. According to Marx and Freud, these events only seem to be intelligible. Actually, they have no meaning without interpretation. To understand is to interpret. And to interpret is to restate the phenomenon, in effect to find an equivalent for it. Thus, interpretation is not (as most people assume) an absolute value, a gesture of mind situated in some timeless realm of capabilities. Interpretation must itself be evaluated, within a historical view of human consciousness. In some cultural contexts, interpretation is a liberating act. It is a means of revising, of transvaluing, of escaping the dead past. In other cultural contexts, it is reactionary, impertinent, cowardly, stifling. 4 Today is such a time, when the project of interpretation is largely reactionary, stifling. Like the fumes of the automobile and of heavy industry which befoul the urban atmosphere, the effusion of interpretations of art today poisons our sensibilities. In a culture whose already classical dilemma is the hypertrophy of the intellect at the expense of energy and sensual capability, interpretation is the revenge of the intellect upon art. Even more. It is the revenge of the intellect upon the world. To interpret is to impoverish, to deplete the world - in order to set up a shadow world of "meanings." It is to turn the world into this world. ("This world"! As if there were any other.)The world, our world, is depleted, impoverished enough. Away with all duplicates of it, until we again experience more immediately what we have.

#### The aff is tokenism - they use the status of people who are idefinitely detained as a starting point to talk about ableist structures of exclusion - their politics is one that highlights the suffering in one group, only to let them be starved to use them as an example of the suffering of another.

### 2NC

**The 1AC's approach to those of disability is to bring them into the fold, to challenge the notion of society that allows their exclusion in the first place - this approach re-entrenches a notion of productivity and denies difference.**

**Gullì 10** (Bruno, philosophy at Long Island University, “Sovereign, Productive, and Efficient: The Place of Disability in the Ableist Society” in “Earthly Plentitudes: A Study of Sovereignty and Labor,” 2010, p.132-155)

She reviews various critiques of equality before speaking of the dependency critique. They are the difference critique, the dominance critique, and the diversity critique. Generally speaking, however, **the** traditional **concept of equality proves incapable of becoming common, for it entails the idea of “man as the mea sure of humanity”** (p. 5). It is then equalities, if anything, that might reach into the common with a view to the fundamental aspect of difference: **“We are different from another and we are equal to another”** (p. 11). Indeed, **difference is a relative category**, whether understood together with identity or with equality. In the former case, **every being is different from any other in virtue of being identical with itself; but precisely in this there is commonality.** In the latter, a being is different from those to which it is not equal in virtue of being equal to those that are not different from it. Obviously, the former situation is, ontologically speaking, more fundamental and common than the latter, of which it must constitute the inner structure.10 Of the latter, Kittay gives an example that might be useful to quote: For instance, **to insist that difference is the property of a deaf child in a class of hearing children— and so the deaf child must accommodate herself to her hearing peers— is to ignore the fact that the hearing child is also different from the deaf child. Neither hearing nor deafness is inherently a difference. Instead the difference is in the relation these children bear to one another.** (Ibid.; emphasis added) The last two sentences show that the most fundamental and common reality is given by a being’s self- identity, or rather by it singularity, its thisness, which points to the commonality of difference as a relational concept, as well as **to the problematic nature of a hastily posited equality.** For Kittay, it is only the dependency critique that moves toward “an appreciation of the inevitable variety of human interaction and a more adequate understanding of what is morally acceptable in asymmetric relations” (p. 15). **This critique** addresses the question of a gendered labor and the necessity of its redistribution; it also **challenges the traditional logic of inclusion and exclusion, typical of the distribution of labor and justice**. In particular, Kittay argues, it highlights the contingent nature of the difference that has historically assigned women the role of dependency workers and caregivers (p. 16). However, she also notes that even among women the work of de pen den cy has not been evenly distributed (p. 28), for class and race are equally fundamental moments in the division of labor. Obviously, dependency work “must be done by someone” (ibid.). The question for Kittay is how to end the stigmatization of this type of work and of those who do it. One of the main reasons for this stigma, particularly in modern, capitalist societies, is that the work of care is not productive. In this sense, **the critique of productivity** and sovereignty **becomes fundamental.** Kittay says: Rather than ask if women’s care of dependents results in them being marked as different, we need to ask whether doing dependency work excludes those who do it from the class of equals, and if so, what we must understand and do to end this exclusion. (Ibid.) It is here that the concepts and realities of productivity and sovereignty show their persistence, here that their critique must be incensed and their danger exposed. Thus, for Kittay, the “dependency critique considers … the inescapable fact of human dependency and the ways in which such **labor makes one vulnerable to domination”** (ibid.). In this sense, **a formal discourse on justice remains far from creating the structures of true equality, which only an emphasis on non- productive, non- sovereign, care can bring about.** In other words, **the truth of a fundamental in equality cannot be altered by a formal positing of the principle of equality** (who is equal to whom?) **that operates through a logic of inclusion** and exclusion. **True equality cannot be established empirically; that is, the standard of the equal must be a transcendental and univocal concept**, such as the dignity of individuation— certainly not man as the measure.11 Otherwise, as in Aristotle, **justice would remain equality for equals and in equality for unequals** (Politics 1280a10– 15). When the latter are excluded from the society of equals, the semblance of equality obtains; so does the shadow of in equality. Merely demanding equality does not solve the problem of who will do the work that generates in equality in the first place: the labor of support and care, the labor without which there could not be a human community. As Kittay says, what is important is a new and fairer distribution of this labor “across the population” (1999: 19). Care and equality are to be brought into “a dialectical relation” (ibid.). In this sense, equality is not a reduction of difference to the same, with the consequent exclusion of the irreducible one(s). Rather, it is the neutrality of subject and object, of carer and cared for— the substance and product of care. It is “being with,” in Nancy’s sense (see Chapter 1). It is also care in Heidegger’s sense, as “being- ahead- of- oneself- already- in (the world) as being- together- with (innerworldly beings encountered)” (1996a: 180).

**The 1AC makes their disability knowable to capitalism – this will get used by capitalism to their detriment.**

**The IC 9**, an anonymous group of French intellectuals. The Coming Insurrection. 2009.

\*\*EDITED FOR ABLEIST LANGUAGE\*\*

In a demonstration, a union member tears the mask off of an anonymous person who has just broken a window. “Take responsibility for what you’re doing instead of hiding yourself**.” To be visible is to be exposed, that is to say above all, vulnerable. When leftists** everywhere **continually make their cause more “~~visible~~-knowable” – whether that of the homeless, of women, or of undocumented immigrants – in hopes that it will get dealt with, they’re doing exactly the contrary of what must be done. Not making ourselves ~~visible-~~knowable, but instead turning** the **anonymity** to which we’ve been relegated **to our advantage, and through conspiracy, nocturnal or faceless actions, creating an invulnerable position of attack. The fires of November 2005 offer a model for this. No leader, no demands, no organization, but words, gestures, complicities. To be socially nothing is not a humiliating condition, the source of some tragic lack of recognition – from whom do we seek recognition? – but is on the contrary the condition for maximum freedom of action.** Not claiming your illegal actions, only attaching to them some fictional acronym – we still remember the ephemeral BAFT (*Brigade Anti-Flic des Tarterêts*)25– is a way to preserve that freedom. Quite obviously, **one of the regime’s first defensive maneuvers was the creation of a “banlieue” subject to treat as the author of the “riots of November 2005.” Just looking at the faces on some of this society’s somebodies illustrates why there’s such joy in being nobody. ~~Visibility~~-knowabilitymust be avoided**. But **a force that gathers in the shadows can’t avoid it forever.** Our **appearance** as a force **must be pushed back until the opportune moment. The longer we avoid ~~visibility-~~knowability, the stronger we’ll be when it catches up with us.** And **once we become visible our days will be numbered. Either we will be in a position to pulverize its reign** in short order, **or we’ll be crushed in no time.**

There is a superstructure.

Ebert and Zavarzadeh 8(Teresa L., English, State University of New York, Albany, Mas’ud, prolific writer and expert on class ideology, “Class in Culture”, p. 36-38)

Thecultural **activism of capital against labor**, however, **was not limited to conservative thinkers. It also** energetically **recruited Left intellectuals and "socialists of the** heart." The defense of free enterprise from the Left has always been of great cultural value to capitalism. **When Left intellectuals defend the market directly-in the guise, for example, of "market socialism"** *(Market Socialism: The Debate among Socialists,* ed. Oilman; *Why Market Socialism? Voices from Dissent,* ed. Roosevelt and Belkin)--**or denounce the enemies of capital as totalitarian, as violators of human rights, and for repressing the play of cultural meanings and thus singularity and heterogeneity** (e.g., Sidney **Hook**, Emesto **Laclau**, Jean-Francois **Lyotard**, Jacques **Derrida**), **their discourses seem more authoritative and sound more credible coming from the supposed critics of capital than do the discourses of conservative authors.** To put it precisely: **the Left has been valuable to capitalism because it has played a double role in legitimating capitalism. It has criticized capitalism as a culture, but has normalized it as an economic system** (e.g., Deleuze and Guat-tari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia;* Duncombe, ed., *Cultural Resistance Reader;* Kraus and Lotringer, eds., *Hatred of Capitalism).* **It** has **complained about capitalism's** so-called corporate **culture**, **but** has **normalized it as a system of wage-labor that** is **grounded on exchange-relations and produces the corporate culture**. **The normalization of capitalism by the Left takes many forms**, **but** all **involve the justification of exploitation, which the Left represents as redemptive. They are** all **versions**-with various degrees of conceptual complexity- -**of** Nicholas D. **Kristof's argument in** his "In **Praise of the Maligned Sweatshop**." **He writes that** the sweatshops in Africa set up by capitalists of the North are in fact "opportunities" and advises that "**anyone who cares about** fighting **poverty should campaign in favor of sweatshops**." His argument is summed up by two sentences printed in boldface and foregrounded in his essay: **"What's worse than being exploited? Not being exploited**" *(The New York Times,* 6 June 2006, A-21). **What** has **made this** double **role** of postwar Left writers **so effective for capitalism is the way their** innovative **writing**, unorthodox **uses of language, and** captivating **arguments have generated** intellectual **excitement**. Jean-Paul **Sartre**, Theodor **Adorno,** Jean-Francais **Lyotard**, Jacques **Derrida**, Judith **Butler**, Jean **Baudrillard**, Jacques **Lacan**, Michel **Foucault**, Gilles **Deleuze**, Giorgio **Agamben**, Slavoj **Zizek**, **and** Stuart **Hall**, to name the most familiar authors, **have each used** quite **different**, **but** still **intellectually intriguing idioms**, **to de-historicize capitalism**. In highly subtle and nuanced arguments, **they have translated capitalism's Authoritarian economic practices**-which quietly force workers to concede to the exploitation of their labor-**into cultural values of free choice and self-sovereignty** (at the same time that they question traditional subjectivity). **Their most effective contributions to capitalism and its economic institutions have been to represent capitalism as a discursive system of meanings and** thus **divert attention away from its economic violence to its semantic transgressions-its homogenizing of meanings** in, for example, popular culture **or its erasure of difference** in cultural lifestyles. **They** have **criticized capitalism**, in other words, **for its** cultural **destruction of human imagination, but** at the same time, they **have condoned its logic of exploitation by dismantling** almost all **the conceptual apparatuses and analytics that offer a materialist understanding of capitalism as an economic system**. More specifically, **they have discredited any efforts to place class at the center of understanding and to grasp the extent and violence of labor practices**. They have done so, in the name of the "new" and with an ecstatic joy bordering on religious zeal (Ronell, *The Telephone Book;* Strangelove, *The Empire of Mind: Digital Piracy and the Anti-Capitalist Movement;* Gibson-Graham, *A Postcapitatist Politics).* **Left thinkers,** for example**, have argued that "new" changes in capitalism**-**the shift**, they claim, **from production to consumption**-**have triggered "a revolution in human thought around the idea of 'culture" which**, under new conditions, **has** itself **become material, "primary and constitutive"** (Hall, "The Centrality of Culture" 220, 215), **and is no** longer secondary and **dependent on** such outside **matters as relations of production**. Consequently, Hall and **others have argued that the analytics of base/superstructure has become irrelevant to sociocultural interpretations because the "new" conditions have rendered such concepts as objectivity, cause and effect, and materialism questionable.** "**The** old **distinction**" **between "**economic **'base' and** the ideological **'superstructure**" therefore **can no longer be sustained because the new culture is** what Fredric Jameson calls **"mediatic**" *(Postmodernism* 68). According to Hall, "media both form a critical part of the material infrastructure ... and are the principal means by which ideas and images are circulated" (Hall 209) . . . The logic of Hall's argument is obtained by treating the "material" as materialist. Media, however, are "material" only in a very trivial sense, they have a body of matter, and are a material vehicle (as a "medium"), but **media are not "materialist**" because, as we argue in our theory of materialism below, **they do not produce "value" and are not "productive." They distribute values produced at the point of production**. The un-said of Hall's claim is that **production and consumption/distribution are no longer distinguishable and more significantly, labor has itself become immaterial-**which is now a popular tenet in the cultural turn (Hardt and Negri, *Multitude).* But, even Paul Thompson, who is not without sympathy for the tum to culture, argues that **"labour is never immaterial. It is not the content of labour but its commodity form that gives 'weight' to an object or idea in a market economy,"** and, he adds, **While it is true that production has been deterritorialised** to an extent, **network firms are not a replacement for the assembly line and do not substitute horizontal for vertical forms of coordination**. Network firms are a type of extended hierarchy, based, as Harrison observes, on concentration without centralisation: 'production may be decentralised, while power finance, distribution, and control remain concentrated among the big firms' *(Lean and Mean: The Changing Landscape of Corporate Power in the Age of Flexibility,* 1994: 20). **Internal networks do not exist independently of these relations of production.** and forms of cooperation, such as teams, are set in motion and monitored by management rather than spontaneously formed. ("Foundation and Empire: A Critique of Hardt and Negri" 84) **Relations of production have shaped and will continue to shape the cultural superstructure. Changes in its phenomenology-**the textures of everyday lifestyles, whether one listens to music in a concert hall, on the radio, or through an iPod-**should not lead to postmodern** Quixotic **fantasies about the autonomy of culture from its material base** [Ebert, *Cultural Critique (with an attitude)].* As Marx writes, the Middle Ages could not live on Catholicism, nor could the ancient world on politics. On the contrary, **it is the manner in which they gained their livelihood which explains why in one case politics, in the other case Catholicism, played the chief part** .... And then **there is** Don **Quixote who long ago paid the penalty for wrongly imagining that knight errantry was compatible with all economic forms of society**. (Marx, *Capital* l, 176).

**The role of the ballot is to align ourselves with the coming revolution - as an intellectual and educator, you have an obligation to prepare academic spaces such as debate to be anti-capitalist.**

**McLaren & Rikowski 1** - \*Professor of Education, leading architect in Critical Pedagogy, \*\* Senior Lecturer in Education Studies and was Acting Head of Education Studies in the School of Education at the University of Northampton. Studies (Peter, Glenn, http://clogic.eserver.org/4-1/mclaren&rikowski.html Pedagogy for Revolution against Education for Capital: An E-dialogue on Education in Capitalism Today, January - February 2001)

Representatives of capital in business, state bureaucracies and government are fundamentally aware of the significance of education and training in terms of labor power production, though they call it 'human capital', but we know what that means! Indeed, read any UK Department of Education and Employment report of the last twenty or more years and they illustrate the intense concern regarding the quality of UK labor power. It is, of course, all wrapped up in such euphemisms or proxy concepts as 'employability', 'human capital', 'work-ready graduates', school kids who are able to 'meet industry's needs' and the like**. Teachers and trainers have huge strategic importance in capitalist society: they are** like **'angels of the fuel dump',** or 'guardians of the flame', in that they have intimate day-to-day responsibility for generating the fuel (labor power) that generates what Marx called the 'living fire' (labor) (Marx, 1858, p.361). Their roles start to explain the intense efforts of representatives of capital in state bureaucracies, government, business and the media in attempting to control the labor of teachers and trainers. **Teachers' and trainers' labor is channeled into labor power production, and increased pressures arising from competition to enhance the quality of labor power within nation states (as one response to globalization), spurs on efforts to do this. The implications are massive: control of curricula, of teacher training, of education unions, training organizations and much more.** There are many means of such control, and empirical and historical investigations are important here. Letting the law of money loose (though education markets) is just one strategy. Attempts to control the processes involved is another, but increasingly both are used in tandem (though these strategies can come into conflict). So, there are strong forces at work to ensure that teachers' and trainers' labor is reconfigured on the basis of labor power production. **But also, teachers and trainers are in a structural position to subvert and unsettle processes of labor power production within their orbits.** Even more, **they can work to enshrine alternative educational principles and practices that bring into question the constitution of society and hint at ways in which expenditure of labor power does not take a value form.** This is a nightmare for representatives of capital. It is an additional factor making for the control of teachers' and trainers' labor. And **this highlights, for me, the central importance of radical or critical pedagogy today,** and why your work, Peter, has such momentous implications and consequences for the anti-capitalist struggles ahead. Peter: And for me, it highlights the significance of education for today's anti-capitalist movement. As you have put it, **radical pedagogy and the anti-capitalist struggle are intimately related**: that was also one of the messages I aimed to establish in my Che/Freire book (McLaren, 2000). Glenn: Your Che/Freire book really consolidated the relation between ant-capitalism and radical pedagogy for me. You see, Peter, when I was younger, I used to think that it would be better being in some industrial situation where the 'real action' was going on, rather than in education. However**, labor power is capital's weakest link**, as it is incorporated within personhood. **Labor power is the commodity that generates value. And education and training are processes of labor power production. Give all this, then to be in education today is to be right at the center of the action! There is no better place to be.** From other things I have said, it follows that education and training, insofar as they are involved in the production of labor power, that, in capitalism, takes the form of human capital, then they are also involved in the capitalization of humanity. Thus: **a politics of human resistance is necessary first of all within education** and training. These are the places that it goes on in the most forced, systematic and overt way. **Radical pedagogy, therefore, is an aspect of this politics, an aspect of resisting processes within education and training that are constituted as processes of reducing humans to labor power (human capital). On this account, radical pedagogy is the hot seat in anti-capitalist struggles.** The question of pedagogy is critical today, and this is where our work productively collides. You have written extensively on Pedagogy for Revolution (though also increasingly, and more directly on the critique of capitalist schooling in recent years). I have concentrated more on the negative analysis of Education for Capital, and said little about pedagogy, though I now realize its absolute importance more clearly after reading your wonderful Che Guevara, Paulo Friere, and the Pedagogy of Revolution (McLaren, 2000). Both are necessary moments within an exploration of what Paula Allman (1999) has called socially transformative praxis. My negative critique of Education for Capital exposes the centrality of the question of pedagogy, I believe. From the other direction, your work on the centrality of pedagogy for the anti-capitalist struggles calls for an exploration of the constitution of society and a negative critique of education as labor power production. **This also provides an argument about the necessity of radical, transformative pedagogy as a key strategy for use in terminating the capitalization of humanity and envisioning an open future**. **It grounds the project of radical pedagogy; shows its necessity in capitalism today**. We can contrast Education for Capital (as an aspect of the capitalization of humanity) with Pedagogy for Revolution (that transforms social relations and individuals, and seeks to curtail the horror of capital within the 'human'). I was wondering if that was how you saw it, Peter. Although we have come at things from different angles, we have arrived at the same spot. Capital is like a labyrinth. Peter: That's a good way of putting it. I think you have spelled out the connections between our work from the development within your own ideas and experience. I might see it slightly differently in some respects. I think I have a stronger notion of Marxism as a philosophy of praxis than you have in your own work, is that fair and accurate? Glenn: I think it is in the sense that is I would not place so much store by the notion of philosophy, though praxis is hugely significant for me. You may say the two go together**. My Marxism was learnt largely through debate**s within the Conference of Socialist Economists, their journal Capital & Class, participating in the (now defunct) Revolutionary Communist Party and going to Socialist Workers Party meetings in the mid-to-late1990s, but most of all through reading Marx. Theorists such as Derek Sayer, John Holloway, Simon Clarke and Kevin Harris were very important for me, and more recently Moishe Postone and the works of Michael Neary (Neary, 1997; Neary and Taylor, 1998). But what do you think, Peter? How do you see Marxism as, for lack of a better word, a philosophy? And how does it link up with your work on pedagogy for revolution? Marx, Marxism and Method Peter: Yes, Glenn, as I see it **Marxism is a philosophy of praxis.** This is so in the sense that it is able to bring knowledge face-to-face with the conditions of possibility for its own embodiment in history, into contact with its own laboring bodies, into contact with its forgotten life-activity, its own chronotype or space-time co-ordinates (i.e., its constitutive outside). Knowledge, even critical knowledge, doesn't reproduce itself, for to assert this much is to deny its inherence in history, its insinuation in the social universe of production and labor. But I guess that's okay with some post-structuralists who tend to reduce history to a text anyway, as if it miraculously writes itself. Postmodern theory is built upon the idea of self-creation or the fashioning of the self. Self-creation assumes people have authorized the imperatives of their own existence, the conditions in which they form or create themselves. But Marxism teaches us that people make history within, against, and through systems of mediation already saturated by a nexus of social relations, by a force-field of conflicting values and accents, by prior conventions and practical activities that constrain the possible, that set limits to the possible. Raya Dunayevskaya (1978) describes Marxism, as I recall, as a 'theoretical expression of the instinctive strivings of the proletariat for liberation'. That pretty much captures the essence for me. Paula Allman (1999) notes that Marx's efforts were directed at exposing 'the inherent and fundamental contradictions of capitalism'. I agree with her that these contradictions are as real today as they were in Marx's time. She enjoins readers to dismiss the criticisms of Marxism as essentialist and teleological and to rely not on the perspectives of Marxists but on the writings of Marx himself. After all, Marx's works constitute a critique of relations historically specific to capitalism. We need to try to understand not only the theoretical concepts that Marx offers us, but also the manner in which Marx thinks. Glenn: It sounds as if there is a role for philosophers in the revolution then. Peter: I think the concrete, objective crisis that we live in today makes philosophy a matter of extreme urgency for all revolutionaries, as Dunayevskaya puts it**. You may not be interested in philosophy, but I am sure philosophy is interested in you.** Well, the specific ideologies of capitalism that frame and legitimize certain philosophical approaches and affirm some over others are interested in your compliance, perhaps that is a better way to put it. **My own interest here is in developing a philosophy of praxis for educators.** The key point for me is when Marx broke from the concept of theory when he wrote about the 'working day' in Capital. Here we see Marx moving from the history of theory to the history of the class struggle. The workers' struggles at the time shifted the emphasis of Marx's work. Dunayevskaya (1978) notes that 'From start to finish, Marx is concerned with the revolutionary actions of the proletariat. The concept of theory now is something unified with action. The ideal and the material became unified in his work as never before and this is captured in his struggle for a new social order in which "the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all."'

### 1NR

**Case**

The 1AC has already been interpolated into the world - any attempt to claim ownership over it is an attempt to legislate the piece, this ignores how the 1AC speech act has already shaped the audience and the affirmative as a team

Bryant 12 - Professor of Philosophy at Collin College (Levi R., Author of a number of articles on Deleuze, Badiou, Zizek, Lacan, and political theory, July 22nd, 2012, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/07/22/machinic-art-the-matter-of-contradiction/)

An artist friend of mine asked me what I’ll be discussing at The Matter of Contradiction conference in Limosine, so I thought it might be nice to post a few words here on where I’m going. I’m a bit terrified by this talk as I’m not an artist and I believe that philosophers should recognize the situated knowledge and practices of other fields rather than presuming to legislate over them. Following Badiou, I believe that philosophers should not so much seek to legislate or dictate to other practices, as hear their Truths. My talk will be focused on three interrelated points. First, I’m interested in emphasizing the materiality or real autonomy of art, or that it is not simply about something, but is something. For me, works of art are objects or machines in their own right, that circulate throughout the world independent of their makers. A work of art is no less a thing or machine than a person, rock, or tardigrade. They take on a life of their own and have their own singular powers and properties. In my view, there’s a tendency to ignore the powers of art per se, to always reterritorialize it on artists intentions and audience receptions, rather than exploring the being of the work of art as a real entity in the world as such. While I agree with everything you say about the production of the work of art– that the production of art involves an immersion of the artist in the medium with which he works such that both artist and medium become something different in the activity of production and such that there isn’t a pre-existent model of the work of art in the artist’s mind that’s then simply placed in material embodiment –I want to argue that art works enjoy a sort of autonomy from both their makers and audiences. We know little about the author of the Epic of Gilgamesh or the creators of the French cave paintings, yet these things are still nonetheless able to resonate and act in the world. There’s thus a way in which, I think, works of art are in excess of all contexts (author’s intention, historical setting, audience reception, etc); and it is because they are in excess of context that they are able to endure throughout the ages. Works of art are perpetually escaping all historical and hermeneutic horizons, all regimes of attraction, and falling into new regimes of attraction modifying them in all sorts of ways. They are examples of the Lucretian clinamen or swerve and are inexhaustible in their ability to produce swerves. This is what the historicists and hermeneuticians miss in their approach to art: the excess of art over any and all historical context or horizon, the constitutive being of art as clinamen. This excess over every horizon is possible because art is a material being. To my knowledge, Deleuze and Guattari do the best job of emphasizing the being of art as object or machine. In chapter 7 of What is Philosophy?, they claim that art preserves and is the only thing that preserves. Paraphrasing them, they point out that Mona Lisa’s smile is preserved in oil for all eternity, or at least until the paint and canvas decay. While I don’t share the view that art is the only thing that preserves, their point is nonetheless well taken. They begin from the observation that art is a material being, an object, not a meaning. In this vein they speak of art works creating blocks of affect and sensation. Reference to “blocks” should be taken literally. The art work does not represent a percept, affect, or sensation, it creates a percept, affect, or sensation that has now become an autonomous material being in its own right, liberated from dependence on the sense organs. These blocks of affect are literally things out there in the world, not just experiences in the sense organs of a person. read on! Second, I want to argue that works of art are machinic rather than hermeneutic. In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari say that the unconscious is a factory, not a theater. By this they mean that the unconscious does not represent or mean, but that it produces. I want to say that works of arts are factories or machines, not theaters. They don’t have meanings, but are powers of producing differences in the world. They are real actors. They do not represent, even in the tradition of realism, but make. I read Proust, for example, and his exquisite discussion of various emotional states has the power to actually create new forms of affect in me that I never before had. I begin to love as Proust’s characters do. The work of art is thus a factory that both transforms the artist that creates it (artists tell me that they become something else as a result of their work) and that transforms the audiences that encounter the work. Works of art are difference engines that circulate throughout the world and that transform the people and things that encounter them. Picasso’s Guernica does not represent the bombing of Guernica, but both transforms the event of that bombing, giving it a new sense, and creates an affect for the slaughter of the innocents everywhere.

**Trading autobiographical narrative for the ballot commodifies one’s identity and has limited impact on the culture that one attempt’s to reform – when autobiographical narrative “wins,” it subverts its own most radical intentions by becoming an exemplar of the very culture under indictment. Even if their best intention is to resist the liberal subject, autobiography is understood by its consuming audience as the assertion of the classic autonomous subject – this subverts the political potential of performance by rendering one’s experience legible to the terms of liberalism .**

**Coughlin 95**—associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. (Anne, REGULATING THE SELF: AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL PERFORMANCES IN OUTSIDER SCHOLARSHIP, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1229)

**Although Williams is quick to detect insensitivity** and bigotry **in remarks made by** strangers, **colleagues**, and friends, **her taste for irony fails her when it** **comes to reflection on her relationship with her readers and the** material **benefits that her autobiographical performances have earned for her.** n196 Perhaps Williams should be more inclined to thank, rather than reprimand, her editors for behaving as readers of autobiography invariably do. When we examine this literary faux pas - the incongruity between Williams's condemnation of her editors and the professional benefits their publication secured her - we detect yet another contradiction between the outsiders' use of autobiography and their desire to transform culture radically. Lejeune's characterization of autobiography as a "contract" reminds us that **autobiography is a lucrative commodity**. In our culture, members of the reading public avidly consume personal stories, n197 which surely explains why first-rate law journals and academic presses have been eager to market outsider narratives. **No matter how unruly the self that it records, an autobiographical performance transforms that self into a form of "property in a moneyed economy**" n198 **and into a valuable** **intellectual** [\*1283] **asset in an academy** that requires its members to publish. n199 Accordingly, **we must be skeptical of the assertion that the outsiders' splendid publication record is itself sufficient evidence of the success of their endeavor**. n200 Certainly, publication of a best seller may transform its author's life, with the resulting commercial success and academic renown. n201 As one critic of autobiography puts it, "failures do not get published." n202 **While writing a successful autobiography may be momentous for the individual author,** **this success has a limited impact on culture**. Indeed, **the transformation of outsider authors into "success stories" subverts outsiders' radical intentions by constituting them as exemplary participants within contemporary culture**, willing to market even themselves to literary and academic consumers. n203 **What good does this transformation do for outsiders who are less fortunate and less articulate** than middle-class law professors? n204 **Although they style themselves cultural critics, the** [\*1284] **storytellers generally do not reflect on the meaning of their own commercial success, nor ponder its entanglement with the cultural values they claim to resist**. Rather, for the most part, **they seem content simply** to take advantage of the peculiarly American license, identified by Professor Sacvan Bercovitch, "**to have your dissent and make it too**." n205

IV. The Autobiographical Self The outsider narratives do not reflect on another feature of autobiographical discourse that is perhaps the most significant obstacle to their goal to bring to law an understanding of the human self that will supersede the liberal individual. **Contrary to the** **outsiders' claim that their personalized discourse infuses law with their distinctive experiences** **and** political **perspectives**, numerous historians and critics of autobiography have insisted that **those who participate in** **autobiographical discourse speak not in a different voice, but in a common voice that** **reflects their membership in a culture devoted to liberal values**. n206 As Sacvan Bercovitch puts it, American cultural ideals, including specifically the mythic connection between the "heroic individual ... [and] the values of free enterprise," are "epitomized in autobiography." n207 In his seminal essay on the subject, Professor Georges Gusdorf makes an observation that seems like a prescient warning to outsiders who would appropriate autobiography as their voice. He remarks that **the practice of writing about one's own self reflects a belief in the autonomous individual**, which is "peculiar to Western man, a concern that has been of good use in his systematic conquest of the [\*1285] universe and that he has communicated to men of other cultures; but those men will thereby have been annexed by a sort of intellectual colonizing to a mentality that was not their own." n208 Similarly, Albert Stone, a critic of American autobiography, argues that autobiographical performances celebrate the Western ideal of individualism, "which places the self at the center of its world." n209 Stone begins to elucidate the prescriptive character of autobiographical discourse as he notes with wonder "the tenacious social ideal whose persistence is all the more significant when found repeated in personal histories of Afro-Americans, immigrants, penitentiary prisoners, and others whose claims to full individuality have often been denied by our society." n210

Precisely **because it appeals to readers' fascination with the self-sufficiency, resiliency and uniqueness** of the totemic individual privileged by liberal political theory, there is a risk that **autobiographical discourse is a** fallible, even **co-opted**, **instrument for the social reforms envisioned by the outsiders**. **By affirming the myths of individual success** in our culture, **autobiography reproduces the** [\*1286] **political, economic, social and psychological structures that attend such success**. n211 In this light, the **outsider autobiographies unwittingly deflect attention from collective social responsibility and thwart the development of collective solutions for the eradication of racist and sexist harms**. **Although we** may **suspect** in some cases that **the author**'s own sense of self was shaped by a community whose values **oppose** those of **liberal individualism, her decision to register her experience in autobiographical discourse will have a significant effect on the self she reproduces**. n212 Her story will solicit the public's attention to the life of one individual, and it will privilege her individual desires and rights above the needs and obligations of a collectivity.

Moreover, literary **theorists** have **remarked the tendency of autobiographical discourse** **to override radical authorial intention**. **Even where the autobiographer self-consciously determines to resist liberal ideology** and represents her life story as the occasion to announce an alternative political theory, "**the relentless individualism of the genre subordinates" her political critique.** n213 Inevitably, at least within American culture, the personal narrative engrosses the readers' imagination. Fascinated by the travails and triumphs of the developing autobiographical self, readers tend to construe the text's political and social observations only as another aspect of the author's personality.

Paradoxically, although autobiography is the product of a culture that cultivates human individuality, the genre seems to make available only a limited number of autobiographical protagonists. n214 Many theorists have noticed that **when an author assumes the task of defining her own**, unique **subjectivity**, **she invariably reproduces herself as a character with whom culture already is well-acquainted**. n215 While a variety of forces coerce the autobiographer [\*1287] to conform to culturally sanctioned human models, n216 **the pressures exerted by the literary market surely play a significant role**. **The autobiographer who desires a** material **benefit from her performance must adopt a persona that is intelligible, if not enticing, to her audience**. n217 As I will illustrate in the sections that follow, **the outsider narratives capitalize on, rather than subvert, autobiographical protagonists that serve the values of liberalism.**